Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

The State of Utah v. Steven Ray Allen : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Christine F. Soltis: Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Eric P. Swenson, Michael H. Wray; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Allen, No. 900156.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2933

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEF

uian

DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9

UlttM aurKtIVIt U A W f

BRIEF

DOCKET NO. %£Et£z
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Docket No.

900156

vs.
STEVEN RAY ALLEN,
Priority No. 2
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, GRAND COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.

ERIC P. SWENSON (3171)
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone: (801) 587-2843
MICHAEL H. WRAY, (4944)
9 Exchange Place, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-2230
Attorneys for Appellant

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

FILED
NOV 7 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

r

IN THE SUPREME

P1 a m t x L1 cm

,

r r

. „ ec,

, r k e t No.

u x AH

900151]

STISVl' M

Priority
Defendant ana Appeiiti •

REPLY BRIEF OF APPEh] AN« '
APPEAL- l*H0M THE SEVENTH DISTRICT ''iH"'l,
<~F U'l'^li

THE HONOKABu', M M y i' h'lM'

•

':

STATE

uISTRICT COURT JUDGE,

ERIC P. SWENSON (3171)
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, Utah 84 5if:
Telephone : (ROT. 5 - "; - / 8 4 3
MICHAEL .
.4044
9 Exchange Place, #9 00
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 11
Telephone: (801) 359-2230
Attorney:-; I 1 J \pp*.-' I !

R. PAUL VAN UAH
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney Gen*-in
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 .;*
a i.ur Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

POINT ONE
ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
BAD ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND RELATED EARLIER
MEDICAL INJURIES OF THE CHILD WAS ERROR
POINT TWO
ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WAS ERROR

POINT THREE
FAILURE TO ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER, AND
FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES,
WASERROR

13

THE EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY AS TO DEFENDANT'S
INTENT, AND AS TO WHETHER HE IN FACT CAUSED
THE CHILD'S DEATH, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THECONVICTION

16

POINT FOUR

CONCLUSION

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

19

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page

Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991)

5

Boggess v. State, 655 P. 2d 654 (Utah 1982)

15

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)

11

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)

9

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)

7

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984)

6

Commonwealth v. Labbe, 373 N.E.2d 227 (Mass. App. 1978)

2

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)

6

Estelle, v. McGuire, 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990), Supreme
Court Docket No. 90-1074

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

10

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)

9

New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990)

8

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)

9

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)

8

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069
(Utah 1991)

11

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

17

Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981)

2

State v. Anderson, 789 P. 2d 27 (1990)

15

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

13

State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439 (Utah 1988)

12

State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991)

6

ii

State v. Coleman, 579 P.2d 732 (Mont. 1978)

7

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983)

14

State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987)

9

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989)

5

State v. Geisler, 594 A.2d 985 (Conn. App., en banc, 1991)

8

State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)

13

State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984)

2

State v. James, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1991)

4,12,17,18

State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1989)
State v. Jensen, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1991)

4
13

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)

8

State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880 (Utah App. 1990)

11

State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1991)
State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991)

17
6

State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1991), cert, denied,
Phillips v. North Carolina, 111 S.Ct. 2804 (1991)

2

State v. Quintero, 60 U.S.L.W. 2165, 1991 WL 207111 (Iowa App.
1991)

5

State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1991)
State v. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 1991)

10
14,15

State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991)

6

State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991)

9

State v. Singh, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1991)

13

State v. Standiford, 769 P. 2d 254 (Utah 1988)

14,15

State v. Steggell, 660 P. 2d 252 (Utah 1983)

10,11

State v. Tanner, 675 P. 2d 539 (Utah 1983)
iii

2

State v. Thomas, 73 S.E.2d 722 (S.C. 1952)

12,13

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991)

8

State v. Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546 (Utah 1987)

15

State v. Velarde, 734 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1986)

10

State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116 (Utah 1989)

16

State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1991)

10,11

Struve v. Wilcox, 579 P.2d 1188 (Idaho 1978), cert. den.
439 U.S. 1123 (1979)

7

United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
United States v. Shunk, 881 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1989)

1
11

United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1982)...11
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

11

STATUTES AND COURT RULES
Idaho Code, 19-4503

7

Idaho Code, 19-4514

7

Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 19 (c) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 103 (d) , Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 4 04(b) , U.R.E

10,11
15
15
4
2,4

Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-206

14

Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14

8

OTHER AUTHORITY
Enhancing Penalties by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence
During Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials—State v. Bishop,
1989 Utah Law Review, 1013

1
iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No, 900156

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
i
]

STEVEN RAY ALLEN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant,
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT

POINT ONE

ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
BAD ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND RELATED EARLIER
MEDICAL INJURIES OF THE CHILD WAS ERROR.

There is an old saying that you can take the fly out of the
soup, but not the taste
illustrates

the

dilemma

of the fly out of the soup. This adage
that

courts

face

when

weighing

the

probative value of prior bad acts against their obvious prejudice.
See, United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Enhancing Penalties by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence During
Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials—State v. Bishop, 1989 Utah Law
Review, 1013, 1016-1017.

In this case, a fundamental dispute

exists between the parties as to whether this Court's ruling in

State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983), should be extended to
Mr Allen's conduct.
Tanner allowed the use of testimony of specific instances of
prior abuse of a child who later died from a blow to the head. The
earlier acts evidenced not only the actor's intent and motive, but
were entirely consistent with the injuries which caused the child's
death.

That

case

therefore

presented

a

situation

where

the

defendant's prior bad acts properly placed the entire affair in a
meaningful context. This is consistent with the meaning and purpose
of Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Virtually

all of the cases cited by Appellee

follow the

reasoning found in Tanner. However, none of those cases dealt with
the same problem found in Mr. Allen's situation, namely, the extent
to which prior abusive conduct is admissible in a case where the
cause of death is not determined.

Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d

843 (Minn. 1981) involved a brain injury following repeated abuse.
State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293

(N.C. 1991),

cert, denied,

Phillips v. North Carolina, 111 S.Ct. 2804 (1991), approved of the
use of the battered child syndrome in the context of a torture
murder.

Commonwealth v. Labbe, 373 N.E.2d 227 (Mass. App. 1978)

approved of evidence of earlier injuries to a child who later died
of liver damage caused by a blow inflicted at a time when the
defendant was alone with the child.

The child's frequent injuries

were admissible to show that someone in a custodial relation to the
boy bore him ill will.
1984)

involved

a

State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D.

finding

that

the
2

child

died

of

suffocation

following repeated abuse.

These cases would likely have different

outcomes if the post mortem findings were as inconclusive as those
in Mr. Allen's case.
The United States Supreme Court now has under consideration a
case which may address some of the same critical issues
in this case.

involved

Estelle v. McGuire, 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990),

Supreme Court Docket Number 90-1074 (Argued October 9, 1991).

The

Ninth Circuit set aside a child-murder conviction in which the
prosecution used evidence of the child's earlier injuries and the
battered

child

syndrome, in conformance with well

established

California law. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence
was not relevant since the injuries were not sufficiently linked to
the defendant's conduct.

McGuire also involved a jury instruction

which did not track the specific issue for which the jurors would
use the prior-injuries evidence. Accordingly, the Court ruled that
McGuire had been denied a fundamentally fair trial in violation of
the Due Process Clause.
This case is similar to McGuire in that the prior-injuriesand-conduct evidence does not adequately relate to one of the
elements of the offense charged, that is, the cause of the child's
death.

In addition, the

jury

instruction, attached hereto as

Addendum Number One, merely cautions the jury that the prior
similar

acts

should

only

be

considered

as

evidence

defendant's intentional, and not mistaken acts.

of

the

And like the

instruction condemned by the Ninth Circuit in McGuire, the guidance
given the jury in this case also permitted a finding of guilt of
3

the crime charged by concluding that Mr. Allen had

committed

similar acts.
This case contrasts with this Court's recent ruling in State
v. James, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1991). James is a case where
there was

no

compelling

evidence

that

the

child's

death

was

accidental, or that the death was not by criminal means. Mr.
Allen's situation involves two equally supportable theories, one as
to an accidental death, and the other, that the death was by
criminal means.

These facts require that the Court resolve the

question as to the use of the challenged evidence in Mr. Allen's
favor.
Accordingly, the trial court failed to adequately weigh the
probative value of the evidence, as required under Rule 404(b),
U.R.E., against its tendency to unfairly prejudice Mr. Allen, as
required by Rule 403, U.R.E; State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137
(Utah App. 1989). Mr. Allen's prior abusive acts admittedly have
some probative value in that they bear on the question of his
intent or motive on the day of the child's death.

However, those

acts and the child's earlier injuries do not establish a reliable
link with either the actual cause or the method or manner of the
child's death. The jurors were therefore presented with a situation
where they had to speculate, unlike James, as to something other
than the defendant's intent and motive. It is this weakness in the
prosecution's

case that the Court must review

in

determining

whether the prior bad acts unfairly prejudiced Mr. Allen. It is Mr.
Allen's contention that this evidence made it likely that the jury
4

chose to punish him for the similar rather than the charged act,
concluding that he is a bad person inclined to violate the law.
See, e.g., State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 289, n.l (Utah 1989)
(Justice Stewart, concurring).

POINT TWO
ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WAS ERROR.

This Court should first decide what standard of review will
apply to the question of whether Mr. Allen's statements to the
police were coerced in light of the recent case of Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 S.Ct.1246

(1991). Appellant has suggested in his

Supp1ementa1 Brief that this Court should as a matter of state
constitutional law adopt a strict policy of reversing every case
where a coerced confession is used.
Brief, p. 2-4.
state

Appellant's

Supplemental

The Iowa Court of Appeals recently relied on that

constitution's

due

process

guarantee

as

a

basis

for

disagreeing with Fulminante, holding that the use of a coerced
statement

is

indeed

a

structural

warranting automatic reversal.

flaw

in

the

trial

process

State v. Quintero, 60 U.S.L.W.

2165, 1991 WL 207111 (Iowa App. 1991).

The use of this rigorous

standard provides the proper framework in which to evaluate Mr.
Allen's contentions.
The trial court refused to listen to a tape recording of the
abuse Allen received during his arrest. Suppression Motion, Tr.
150-151; Trial, Tr. 790. Nor was the jury allowed to determine the
5

context

in

which

the

statements

were

made.

California

v.

Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479 (1984); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1986).

This

unwillingness

to

fully

consider

the

evidence

inevitably resulted in a ruling that the statements were voluntary.
Surprisingly, the government's first line of defense to this claim
of error

is that the trial court

in fact did

listen to the

recording. Appellee's Brief, p. 34. This most certainly is not the
case.

Appellant attaches as Addendum Number Two, the portions of

the record which

should

lay this contention to rest.

If in

reviewing the record this Court remains uncertain as to whether in
fact the trial court listened to the tape, then Appellant requests
that the case be remanded for a factual determination on this
question.
Contrary to Appellee's assertion, Appellee's Brief, p. 38,
attenuation is in fact a critical aspect of this case.

There are

two issues which come under the heading of "attenuation".

The

first concerns the question of voluntariness and involves the issue
of whether the effect of the abuse Mr. Allen received during his
arrest

was

interrogation.

sufficiently

dissipated

at

the

time

of

his

See, e.g., State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App.

1991) ; State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991) ; State v. Sims,
808 P. 2d 141 (Utah App. 1991).

The second issue is whether the

link between Mr. Allen's arrest in Idaho and subsequent illegal
detention in Montana was sufficiently attenuated at the time of his
interrogation. The issue of attenuation-voluntariness is difficult
for this Court to resolve, since the trial court did not fully
6

consider the evidence, particularly the tape recording, as well as
failing to make adequate findings on this issue.
Appellee did not adequately respond to the attenuation issue
involved in Mr, Allen's Idaho arrest and Montana detention, see,
Appellee's Brief, p. 37-38, n. 16, other than concluding without
discussion that the officers had

legal authority

to make the

arrest. They may have had such authority, as private citizens,
Idaho Code, 19-4514, or under the common
Coleman, 579 P.2d 732, 744 (Mont. 1978).

law rule, State v.
However, the officers

clearly had no right to take him to Montana without processing him
through the Idaho courts. Idaho Code, 19-4503, et. seq. (Idaho
Extradition Law); Struve v. Wilcox, 579 P.2d 1188, 1195-1196 (Idaho
1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1123 (1979) (Fugitive arrested in Idaho
entitled to a probable cause hearing and the right to counsel upon
arraignment). Appellant's contention that the unlawful Montana
detention itself renders the statements inadmissible absent some
showing of attenuation is not addressed in the State's brief.

Nor

was this issue included in the trial court's decision from the
bench

at the conclusion

of the suppression hearing,

although

Appellant had briefed this issue. Judgment Roll and Index, p. 210238.
was

However, the trial court later ruled that the Idaho arrest
immaterial. See, Trial, Tr. 794.

detention

is

an

important

factor

in

An unlawful arrest or
determining

whether

accused's statements are voluntary or otherwise tainted.

an

See,

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), and the authorities cited
in Brief of Appellant, at p. 25.
7

Appellant is obliged to inform this Court that there is a
recent Supreme Court case, decided after Mr. Allen's trial, but not
discussed in Appellee's Brief, which may be contrary to Appellant's
position regarding his unlawful Montana detention.
Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
following

an unlawful

entry

New York v.

Harris involved a warrantless arrest
into the

suspect's

apartment,

violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

in

The Court

held that this manner of arrest does not require the suppression of
the defendant's subsequent statements if there was probable cause
for the arrest. The Harris reasoning would not satisfy Utah's
constitutional requirements. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section
14; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v. Thompson,
810 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1991) . These Utah cases on this subject confirm
the trend of Utah courts to provide more protection than that found
under federal law.
en

banc,

1991),

In State v. Geisler, 594 A.2d 985 (Conn. App.,
the

Connecticut

court

rejected

the

Harris

reasoning, and chose instead to impose a stricter standard using
the same rationale approved by the Utah courts.

Therefore, this

Court should rule that Mr. Allen's statements are inadmissible.
Appellant claims that his waiver of the right to remain silent
was inadequate.

Appellant's Brief, P. 29-31.

The record reveals

that the Attorney General's Investigator, Mr. Hines, rushed to
Montana after learning of Mr. Allen's arrest to quickly interrogate
him in order to "eliminate mostly jail contaminance (sic)", i.e.,
legal advice from lawyers, Suppression Motion, Tr. 34, immediately
asked the Sheriff if Allen had contacted an attorney, Tr. 37-38,
8

and then began his interview by deliberately failing to read Mr.
Allen the waiver portion of the Miranda form. Plaintiff's Exhibit
Number

Eight,

attached

hereto

as

Addendum

Number

Three;

Suppression Motion, Tr. 38-39; Trial, Tr. 596-598; 614-616.
Mr. Allen never signed the form signifying that he understood
his rights and wished to go ahead with questioning. Rather, there
is the interrogators' mere assurance that in fact there was a valid
waiver. One recent case illustrates the principle that the signing
of a waiver form indicates that a subject in fact understood his
rights and waived the right to remain silent. State v. Singer, 815
P.2d 1303, 1310 (Utah App. 1991). The deception in not presenting
the entire waiver form effectively prevented Mr. Allen from having
a

"...full awareness both of the nature of the right being

abandoned and of the consequences of the decision to abandon it."
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
This Court has held that a waiver of the right to remain
silent "... must be both intentional and made with full knowledge
of the consequences, and the defendant is given the benefit of
every reasonable presumption against such a waiver", State v.
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), citing Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387

(1977).

Fulton, at 1211, also held that "In

determining the validity of a waiver, a court is to consider all
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, as well

as

suspect's

ability

actions"

(Emphasis

Supplied),

to clearly

understand

the import of his

the

citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,

372-376 (1979). Mr. Hines failure to provide all of the contents of
9

the waiver form to Mr. Allen clearly violates this standard.
However, the State claims that Mr. Hines did read and then
explain the rights on the form.

Appellee's Brief, p. 40.

This is

in fact not the case. Suppression Motion, Tr. 38-39; Trial, Tr.
596-598, 614-616.

Mr. Allen received no explanation as to the

contents of the form which pertained to the waiver of his rights.
And, Appelleefs Brief completely fails to address any of the legal
issues which arose as a result of this episode. Therefore, since
the State has failed in its burden to prove a valid waiver, Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d
440,

443

(Utah

1986),

this

Court

should

reverse

Mr. Allen's

conviction.
Still another issue involves the fact that the trial court's
decision from the bench failed to fully cover the wide range of
issues involved in the use of Mr. Allen's statements to the police,
and lacked the depth necessary for appellate review. Rule 12(c),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;

State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv.

Rep. 7, 14-15 (Utah 1991); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300-1301
(Utah App. 1991).

Appellant amply documents six areas in which the

Court failed to address key

issues raised

motion. See, Brief of Appellant, p. 33.

in his

suppression

In contrast, Appellee

fails to adequately address any of these claims. Appellee's Brief,
p. 44-45.
Appellee claims that Mr. Allen waived this most important
point,

citing

State

v.

Steggell,

660

P.2d

252

(Utah

1983).

However, Steggell was decided well before the many cases refining
10

the obligation of findings, and in any event did not involve a
suppression

motion.

failure

object

to

testimony.

Rather,
to

the

Stecrcrell pertained

court's

comments

Appellee refers to no other case.

to

about

counsel's

a witness'

There is no statute

or procedural rule which requires counsel to make the request or
waive the right.

And, a waiver cannot be implied when the record

is silent on this issue, c.f., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
(1969).

The modern trend

in Utah

is that a party's conduct

amounting to a waiver must be unequivocal and inconsistent with any
other intent.

See, e.g., Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,

808 P.2d 1069, 1074-1075 (Utah 1991);
Although adequate findings are Mr. Allen's right, Rule 12(c),
U.R. Cr.P, they are also for the benefit of the reviewing courts.
State v. Vigil, supra, at 30; State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882
n. 1 (Utah App. 1990) .

This is particularly important in Mr.

Allen's case, where the trial court failed to consider such crucial
evidence as the tape recording of the arrest, and failed to address
many of the factual and legal issues in its decision from the
bench.
Turning to another issue, the Tenth Circuit has held: "A
defendant

cannot

uncorroborated

be

convicted

extrajudicial

solely

statement".

on

the

basis

United

of

an

States

v.

Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 1982), citing Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Historically, the purpose

of the corpus delicti doctrine was to prevent convictions based on
coerced confessions.

United States v. Shunkf 881 F.2d 917, 919
11

(10th Cir.

1989) .

This doctrine

is therefore

of

particular

importance when viewed in light of Mr. Allen's claim that his
statements were coerced.
Appellant asserts that the State failed to prove the corpus
delicti of the crime charged as to the criminal means of the
victim's death, thereby making Mr. Allen's statements to the police
inadmissible.

See, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), and

Brief of Appellant, p. 31-32.

Appellee's first defense to this

argument, Appellee's Brief, p. 44, misstates the facts by alleging
that the medical evidence established that the child had not
of

natural

causes.

To

the

contrary,

the

medical

died

evidence

established no cause of death at all, natural or otherwise.

See,

Trial, Tr. 437, 495, 502 (Dr. Fantelli); Tr. 559-560 (Dr. Palmer);
Tr. 377-378 (Dr. Murray); and Tr. 662 (Dr. Rothfeder).

And, some

of the pathologist's observations were entirely consistent with a
death by natural and non criminal means, Tr. 564-567

(Findings

consistent with child's aspiration of candy).
If the medical findings had specifically indicated that the
child did not die of natural causes, then this case would fall
within State v. James, supra, citing State v. Thomas, 73 S.E.2d 722
(S.C. 1952). James involved a situation where the sole caretaker
reported the child missing, claiming that the victim was taken from
a locked car parked at a shopping center. The child's remains were
later found concealed in the waters of a marina. No specific cause
of death was ascribed by the State's pathologist.

The body was

wrapped with a covering in the sole possession of the caretaker and
12

which came from the James' residence, had not been in the car when
the alleged kidnapping had occurred.

Thomas involved a situation

where the pathologist testified that a blow causing the damage
which was found on the victim's facial structure would have been
fatal, although no exact cause of death could be determined. Mr.
Allen's case presents two supportable theories as to the cause of
the child's death.
to m^et

Since both are plausible, the State has failed

its burden of proof that death was

indeed caused by

criminal means. Therefore, his statements should not have been
admitted.

POXNT THREE

FAILURE TO ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER, AND
FAILURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES,
WAS ERROR.

In State v. Jensen, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 32 (Utah 1991),
this Court recently set out the test fo*- determining when a lesser
included offense instruction must be given by the trial court. The
test requires a showing that the statutory elements of the two
offenses are related, and that the evidence provides a reasonable
basis for a finding of not guilty of the greater crime and a
finding of guilty on the lesser offense. See, State v. Gotschall,
782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Singh, 171 Utah,Adv. Rep. 39, 41
(Utah App. 1991) . Due Process entitles a defendant to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,
13
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(Utah

1983) . This

court must

view

the

evidence

and

the

inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the defense. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). And,
the Utah Court of Appeals recently held: "We review a trial court's
refusal to give a requested instruction under a correction of error
standard, granting no particular deference to the trial court's
ruling". State v. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 1991).
Appellant requested that the court provide an instruction
giving the jury the alternative of finding the defendant guilty of
negligent homicide, or child abuse, and/or aggravated assault. The
evidence

did provide ample support

for the

jury

to

find

the

defendant not guilty of murder and guilty of negligent homicide,
notwithstanding Appellee's lengthy but limited view of the facts.
The child suffered a broken rib and some bruises the day of his
death. Trial, Tr. 43 6-43 9. There was also substantial evidence that
the child was eating caramel candy at the time of his death, Tr.
217, as well as police testimony that Mr. Allen admitted hitting
the child. See, Tr. 604. The jury could have concluded that the boy
aspirated the candy when the defendant struck him in the ribs.
That factual scenario presents a classic case of negligent homicide
under UCA 7 6-5-2 06. Negligent homicide is related to manslaughter.
Both

require

"a

gross

deviation"

from

the

standard

of

care

exercised by the ordinary person. State v. Standiford, 769 P. 2d
254,

267

(Utah 1988). The key difference is that manslaughter

requires that the defendant was actually aware of the risk of
death,

while

in

negligent

homicide
14

the

defendant

was

not.

Standiford, supra, citing Boqcress v. State, 655 P. 2d 654, 656-658
(Utah 1982) (Stewart, J., concurring); State v. Sherard, 169 Utah
Adv. Rep. 50, 53

(Utah App. 1991) .

These principles are not

applicable to the other homicide statutes. See, State v. Tillman,
750 P. 2d 546, 569 (Utah 1987) ("no unintentional, negligent, or
accidental killing regardless of the circumstances can be first
degree murder"). Accordingly, a lesser included offense as to
negligent homicide would have been appropriate.
However, Appellee claims that Appellant waived any objection
to the denial of these requested

instructions because of the

failure to set out in detail any opposing argument, contrary to
Rule 19(c), U.R.Cr.P. Appellant did submit a requested instruction
on negligent homicide. Appellant also objected to the exclusion of
this and other proposed instructions without providing the lengthy
argument which Appellee feels is required under the rule. Should
the Court feel that Appellant's objection was not adequate, it
should consider the issues in any event.
Rule 19(c), U.R.Cr.P., provides for appellate review in the
event of a failure to preserve a point on appeal in cases "to avoid
a manifest injustice". And Rule 103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence,
allows

this

court to take

"notice

of plain

errors

affecting

substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention
of the court".

State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). The

standard under both rules is that the error must be plain, that it
should have been obvious to the trial court that it was committing
error, and that the omission affected the substantial rights of a
15

party. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989).
The State's theory of the case clearly

focused

on their

contention that Mr. Allen had suffocated the child while in the
course of assaultive and abusive behavior. Appellee's Brief, at p.
31. There was also considerable discussion by the four medical
experts during the trial that the child may have choked on a piece
of Rollo's candy. See, e.g., Trial, Tr. 564-567. The defense
encouraged this latter idea throughout the trial, and it should
have been more than apparent to the trial court that the proposed
negligent homicide instruction would fit neatly into this theory.
The absence of the negligent homicide instruction, as well as
the lack of the other requested instructions, did substantially
impact

Mr. Allen's

defense,

since

the

remaining

instructions

offered the jury no option but to convict should they come to the
conclusion

that he committed

abusive

acts without

the

intent

necessary for a murder conviction. This conclusion is reasonable
under

the

evidence.

See,

Trial,

Tr.

604

(Mr.

Allen

tells

investigator Hines that he hit the child not intending to kill
him) . Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. Allen's conviction
and remand the case for a new trial.

POINT FOUR

THE EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY AS TO DEFENDANT'S
INTENT, AND AS TO WHETHER HE IN FACT CAUSED
THE CHILD'S DEATH, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE CONVICTION.

16

Mr.

Allen

asserts

that

the

evidence

is

insufficient,

particularly as to whether proof of his intent justifies a murder
conviction. Appellantf s Brief, p. 40-43. In response, the State
misstates both the facts and Appellant's position. Appellee's
Brief, p. 55-59.

Appellant has not conceded that the victim died

a non accidental death.

Any inference to the contrary may arise

during Appellant's marshalling of the facts. Those facts are based
solely on admissible evidence, e.g., State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv.
Rep. 44, 47 (Utah App. 1991), and which are required for adequate
appellate review. Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985).
State v. James. supra, at 15-18, determined that the evidence
was sufficient as to the defendant's intent to support a murder
conviction. The State argues, Appellee's Brief, p. 58-59, that the
circumstantial evidence relative to intent includes the destruction
of evidence, urging the mother to not authorize an autopsy, and
making inconsistent statements to investigators and others as to
the events of the boy's death.

However, the James court held, at

16, that a defendant's flight cannot be used as evidence of intent,
and that efforts to conceal the crime or to forestall investigation
are likewise inadmissible.
The remaining evidence in James, namely, the defendant's past
history

of

conduct

toward

the

victim

and

the

circumstances

surrounding the child's disappearance, according to two Justices,
was sufficient on this issue. Nevertheless, three other Justices,
at 24, felt that this evidence may not be sufficient should the
17

jury disbelieve an informant who extracted a jail house confession.
Although weak on the issue of intent, the facts in James are much
stronger than those found in this case, since the Allen facts raise
a much stronger inference that the victim died accidently.
Accordingly, there is a proper basis for this Court, should Mr.
Allen's other defenses fail, to remand the case for the entry of a
manslaughter conviction.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse Mr. Allen's conviction and grant a
new trial.
Dated this 7th day of November, 1991.

Michael H. Wray
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I hand delivered four copies of the
foregoing to the office of the Utah Attorney General, to the
attention of Christine F. Soltis, at 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 7th day of November, 1991.
Dated this 7th day of November, 1991.

Eric P. Swenson
Michael H. Wray
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

NUMBER

INSTRUCTION

ONE

NO.

You have heard evidence that the defendant committed acts similar
to acts alleged

to have occurred incident to the crime charged her.

You

may consider such evidence, not to prove that the defendant did the acts
charged here, but only to prove defendants state of mind, that is, that
the defendant

acted

with

the necessary

intent

and

not

through

accident

or mistake.
Therefore, if you find:
1)
f]\e

that

the State

has

proved

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

that

defendant committed the acts charged in the information, and
2)

that the defendant committed similar acts at other times,

then you may consider
committed
mistake*

these similar acts as evidence that the defendant

the acts charged here deliberately and not through accident or

1

taken care of, that I would be able to confer with my

2

attorney during arraignment — which was as far as I know -

3
4

Q

That doesn't answer my question, sir.

5

ask you or —

6

could not have an attorney before the arraignment?

7

A

or did they tell you specifically that you

Not specifically, no.
MR. PARRISH: Okay.

8
9

I have nothing further,

Your Honor.

10

THE COURT: Anything else?

11

MR. SWENSON:
THE COURT:

12
13
14
15
16
17

Did they

No, Your Honor.
Thank you.

You may step down,

Mr. Allen.
MR. SWENSON: Your Honor, the next portion of
our evidence is — we offer and ask the court to accept into
evidence the tape recording of Mr. Allen's arrest.
THE COURT: That portion that was recorded -

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. SWENSON:
THE COURT:

That portion —
(Continuing) —

of which I have

read the transcript that was attached to your motion?
MR. SWENSON:

Well, there seems to be some

disagreement as to the accuracy of the transcript.

In any

event, I know Mr. Parrish has an objection to use of this
evidence, but which I'm sure we'll hear, but —
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THE COURT: Well, of course, we don't object

1
2

to it in this hearing.

3

the trial or not; but as far as the —

4

materiality with regard to the Motion to Suppress.

5

you want me to do, Mr. Swenson?
MR. SWENSON:

6
7

if it has any
So what did

I want you to listen to the

tape.
THE COURT: You mean your transcription of it

8
9

I don't know that we can allow it in

is not accurate?

10

MR. SWENSON:

11

MR. PARRISH:

Well

~

No, it isn't, Your Honor.

12

We've had the sheriff's office and people that were there go

13

back over it, and there are several places, especially the

14

ones

15
16

that

were

relied

upon by

inaccurate in the transcript.

the

defense

that

are

And we have a revised

transcript that was typed by the sheriff's office that they

17

claim is accurate.

18

talk about listening to that, and the witness that was

19

recording it and can testify as to the accuracy. Because of

20

the dispute, I guess I have a problem with the court relying

21

simply on the transcript that was provided by the defense

22

because it is inaccurate.

23
24
25

And we've got a

witness here that can

If the court is inclined to

listen to that type of evidence, it might be better just to
listen to the tape and hear for yourself.
that is simply materiality.

My objection to

I don't believe that there's

148
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1

been any showing of any causal connection between what

2

occurred at the time of the arrest and what occurs thirty

3

hours later when Mr. Allen is interviewed by Mr. Hines and

4

Mr. Printz.

5

he wasn't in fear of these people, that there was no

6

particular problem related to that. And under case law, it

7

seems to me, unless you can show that causal connection, the

8

defendant can't rely on things that happened that remotely

9

from the time of the entry.

And he's basically admitted on the stand that

THE COURT:

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

provided.

I've gone through it.

the opinion that even if taken —

23
24
25

if this is correct, I can

error that it has any materiality on whether or not — what
he was doing at the time he gave the statement.
MR. SWENSON:

Well, we believe, of course,

the transcript is just one dimensional —
THE COURT: Well, I know. I know. I realize
that.
MR. SWENSON: And the recording of the voices

21
22

And, of course, I am of

take it into account. But I don't think there's sufficient

19
20

Mr.

Swenson, I have, of course, read the transcript that you

17
18

Of course, I think this —

certainly —
THE COURT: What I'm going to do, even though
Of course, it's your contention, is it, Mr. Parrish,
that actually the directed transcript isn't as strong as the
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1

words used here?
MR. PARRISH:

2

There are a few parts that

3

don't support the defendant's version of what happened.

4

again, they're all part of something that —

5

whole thing is immaterial.

7

of the weight.

8

cases

I think the

That's my feeling.

MR. SWENSON:

6

But

I think it goes to the question

I cited Brown vs. Illinois and some of these other

—

9

THE COURT: Of course, I'm just interested in

10

getting this information without having to sit and listen to

11

that tape.

12
13
14
15

have

I don't want to listen to that tape, because I

practically

something

what

was

in there that

said.

And

unless

there

is

is stronger than what material

you've got here, I'll take this and use it in my decision.
That's the point.

16

MR. PARRISH: Well, Your Honor, based on what

17

you have indicated, I have no objection at this point to

18

that process.

19

to review that tape.

In other words, the state is not asking you

20

THE COURT: So I will take this, Mr. Swenson,

21

and we'll consider it as what happened, at least as far as

22

that recording is concerned.

23

effect I know basically what the tape says.

24
25

MR.

SWENSON:

And I have read it so, in

I

guess, Your

Honor, the

problem is that the dry words simply don't address real
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1

meaning to the affair that —
THE COURT: Of course, you don't contend that

2
3

this records everything that occurred?
MR. SWENSON:

4
5

recording was on —
THE COURT: Well, sure, when it was on. But

6
7

it wasn't on all the time?
MR. SWENSON: Well, there was a period before

8
9

hand that —
THE COURT:

10
11

partial —

MR. SWENSON:

14

trying

to

everything.

16
17
18

and

Well, as to the point we're

emphasize,

it

covers

virtually

So it's complete as to —
Well, anyway, I will take this

court as being what the tape says.

So anything else, Mr.

Swenson?
MR. SWENSON:
THE COURT:

20

No. We rest.
All right.

Any rebuttal, Mr.

Parrish?
MR. PARRISH:

22
23

This was only just a

and you can use it in your argument — legal argument to the

19

21

raise

THE COURT:

15

Sure.

of the actual recording?

12
13

Well, as to when the tape

If I might have just a moment,

Your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Sure.

25

MR. PARRISH:

Your Honor, we would like to
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1

that needs to be made outside the

—

2

THE COURT: All right. Ladies And gentlemen,

3

the Court is going to hear a matter that I have to rule on.

4

So while you're outside the presence of the Court, don't

5

discuss the case among yourselves, don't allow anyone to

6

discuss it in your presence, and don't make up your minds on

7

any issue until it's finally submitted to you.

8

outside the court for a moment, please.
(Whereupon, the jury leaves the presence of

9
10

the court.)
THE COURT:

II
12
13
14
15

18
19

We'll have the record show that

we're now in session outside the hearing of the jury.

Mr.

Swenson, I assume that the next questions to the defendant
would be relative to the incident involving his arrest; is
that correct?
MR. SWENSON:

16
17

Just step

That's correct, Your Honor.

The entire sequence of events that we covered last week in
the Motion Hearing dealing with what, we believe, were
allegations of abuse of Mr. Allen by the police.

20

THE COURT: I take it Mr. Allen would testify

21

very much how he did at the Hearing relative to these

22

incidents?
MR. SWENSON:

23

He would, Your Honor, although

24

in more detail.

I think there was some limitation last week

25

as to the broad range; but essentially, it would be the
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1

same, yes. And in that regard, there is a matter which also

2

was covered in the Evidentiary Ruling last week concerning the

3

tape recording of the events of this abusive arrest, which

4

we would

5

testimony, would

6

evidence.

7

Motions Hearing.

8

to have the jury hear the tape.

also, as part of

The

like to now ask
foundation

was

of Mr. Allen's

the Court

laid, of

admit

into

course, at

the

We'd like that admitted into evidence and

THE COURT:

9

the proffer

Well, first of all, of course,

10

let the record show that I did hear this testimony at a

11

Suppression Hearing or Motion in Limine Hearing, and I've

12

also read the transcribed of the tape as submitted by the

13

defendant. And I ruled at that hearing that those instances

14

were immaterial to this case, since they wouldn't help the

15

jury; and it opened so many issues where we might get off on

16

a side track, whether they were correct or not correct,

17

which we don't think would help in any way of disposing of

18

the ultimate issues in this case.

19

prejudicial affect on the proceedings of the trial would

20

greatly out weigh any relevance that the transcript

21

possibly could come from the introduction of this evidence.

22

This took place, I believe it was, —

23

twenty-four hours before Mr. Hines talked to him.

24

it?

25

MR. SWENSON:

In other words, the

—

Well, at least some
Or was

Roughly.
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THE COURT:

1

Twenty-four, twenty-eight hours

2

prior; that there wasn't anything in that incident that I

3

could find that would have a substantial or even any type of

4

effect on his later conduct in his relationship of giving of

5

the statement to Mr. Hines.

6

for dispute which are not material to the case.
MR. SWENSON:

7

And all it does is open areas

I see.

Well, we did want to

8

submit it to show his state of mind as he was making the

9

statements.

10

THE COURT:

Well, of course, my ruling is

11

that's so far removed.

I can't see any evidence where it

12

would have any affect upon the state of mind that would

13

destroy, at least, his ability —

14

momentary, or whether he was coerced into giving any type

15

of a statement later on.

whether or not it was a

16

MR. SWENSON:

17

already Briefed all of these issues prior —

18
19

I see.

And I believe we've

THE COURT: Sure. And I considered those at
the prior hearing.

20

MR. SWENSON:

I understand.

21

THE COURT: You can reserve your objection -

22
23

MR. SWENSON:

One other matter, as Attorney

24

Wray continues his questioning, I assume —

25

sure this is clear so we don't say something improper in

I want to make
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1

front of the jury. He would then ask him if he was arrested

2

and then continue on subsequent to the actual events of the

3

arrest?

Is that the Court's ruling?

4

THE COURT: Yes.

5

MR. WRAY:

Your Honor, I heard, but I'm not

6

certain I understand.

7

relative to the treatment that Mr. Allen received at the

8

time of his arrest?
THE COURT:

9
10

Am I precluded from asking questions

Yes.

You are for the reasons

stated.

11

MR. WRAY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

12

MR. SWENSON: But Attorney Wrav could examine

13

—

14

there were some statements made by Mr. Allen to one of the

15

officers.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

There was an instance on the way in to the jail in which

And that was not —
THE COURT:

Of course, those statements are

not in evidence.
MR. SWENSON:
that at the Hearing?

Wasn't there some evidence of

I thought there might have been, and

I'm preparing a rebuttal witness on that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But that's not before this jury.
MR. SWENSON:

Well, not at this point, no.

THE COURT: There's no evidence of that type
in the plaintiff's case.
MR. SWENSON:

Well, if it's not raised, we
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1

don't intend to offer it.
THE COURT:

2
3

state's plans are.

4

MR.

Well, I don't know what the

I only know what's before me now.
PARRISH:

Your

Honor,

the

state's

5

position would be that the next point that becomes relevant

6

is the time that the interview begins. Under Crane vs. Kentucky,

7

the case I cited this morning, the incidents related to the

8

arrest —

9

ride to the jail, what occurs in the jail, all of that is

the incidents related to what occurs in the car

10

basically

irrelevant

from

11

Suppression Hearing.

12

that wasn't presented there.

what

we've

heard

in

the

Unless there was some new evidence

13

THE COURT: Well, that's my ruling, too.

14

MR. SWENSON:

Could I have the citation of

15

that case, Your Honor? I'm sorry to delay the proceeding on

16

that, but —
THE COURT:

17
18

I think it's in your Memorandum',

isn't it?

19

MR. SWENSON:

20

MR. PARISH:

I don't think it is.
I don't think it is.

It's 475

21

United States Reports 683. It's United States Supreme Court

22

Case of 1986.

23

MR. SWENSON: Well, we're a little uncertain

24

as to whether the Court's ruling does cover any prior

25

statements —

793
ine Musselman
ItedCouri Transcriber

P.O. Box 531

THE COURT:

1

Well, the only thing —

You'll

2

have to proceed and will Mr. Parrish will object, and I'll

3

rule.
MR. SWENSON:

4
5

I'm just trying to get this

straighten out so we understand.
THE COURT:

6

Sure. But I'm telling you now if

7

you go into any of those incidents relative to what happened

8

to the time of his arrest, under the present state of the

9

evidence and my ruling, you can't bring that in; and you

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

cannot use the tape at this particular point.
about the tape —

the entire sequence.

25

It was taped by one of the officers

arrest.

So it could be distorted and taken clear out of

context.

But I don't want to get into the context, because

the whole episode —

it's immaterial to the issue that

happened here in Moab.

And to get into that, then we put on

rebuttal witnesses about it; then we're fighting whether he
had a good arrest or whether he was arrested in Idaho or
Montana, which is immaterial.
MR. SWENSON:

That's another reason.
I understand.

Thank you very

much
THE COURT:

23
24

It doesn't tape

and only included a portion of the sequence relative to his

21
22

it's only a partial tape.

My ruling

All right.

You may call back in

the jury.
(Whereupon,

the

jury

returns

to

the
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1

courtroom.)
THE COURT:

2

We'll have the record show the

3

jury has now returned to the courtroom.

4

proceed, Mr. Wray.

5

MR.

6

Thank you,

Your

Honor.

I

apologize for the brief delay, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sure.

7

DIRECT EXAMINATION, continuing

8
9

WRAY:

And you may

BY MR. WRAY;

10

Q

Steve, you were arrested?

II

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And you were taken to jail?

A

Yes.

Q

And do you remember what day of the week this

12
13
14
15

would have been?
A

At the time, I didn't know what day of the week it

Q

Okay.

A

Yes, sir.

20

Q

What's the first time you saw Mr. Hines?

21

A

The sheriff escorted me into the conference room.

16
17

was.

18
19

22
23
24
25

Do you remember meeting Mr. Hines?

It was an interrogation room.
Q

Let me ask: When you say the sheriff, who do you

mean?
A

Sheriff Printz of Ravili County, Montana.
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YOUR RIGHTS
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Date
Time

Before we ask you any questions, you must understand
your rights.
You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used against you in court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice
before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during
questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed
for you before any questioning, if you wish.
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer
present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any
time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time
until you talk to a lawyer.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
I have read this statement of my rights, and I
understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement
and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I
understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have
been made to me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been
used against me.
Signed..
Witness
Witness
Time
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